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Abstract 
The literature observes that, while there are ostensibly benefits to sharing of data and 
information, barriers to organisational data sharing appear significant. Managers may be 
understandably concerned that the sharing activity is adversely affecting their own 
organisations.  
This paper develops a model of data sharing based on the traditional system model, and 
proposes a theory of the sharing activity in organisations. The paper theorises that employees 
may engage in or oppose sharing based on the assessment of perceived benefits accruing to 
themselves from the activity. In particular, the paper highlights the contention that data 
sharing decreases as organisations grow, and also offers an explanation for why the sharing 
activity is so poorly undertaken in modern organisations. 
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Introduction 
An early expectation of information and communication (ICT) technologies was that they 
would enable greater sharing of data, information and knowledge in organizations. Such 
sharing would ostensibly lead to improvements in organizational functioning and performance 
(e.g. Power 1983; Yu et al. 2001; Li 2002; Roth et al. 2002; Sahin and Robinson 2002). 
However, expectations on this front have become more circumspect over time in light of 
evidence that actual sharing is rather more difficult than initially expected (e.g. Davenport 
1994). Goodhue et al. (1992) note that “the ability to make coordinated, organization-wide 
responses to today’s business problems is thwarted by the lack of data integration” and, with 
respect to information sharing, Davenport et al. (1992) argue that “the rhetoric and technology 
of information management have far outpaced the ability of people to understand and agree on 
what information they need and then to share it [so] the information-based organization is 
largely a fantasy”. Even in a scientific research environment, where information sharing is at 
least prima facie an explicit norm of the community, barriers to sharing appear substantial 
(Hubbard and Little 1997). 
It has been argued that ownership perceptions and organizational norms influence the sharing 
of data and information (Jarvenpaa and Staples 2001; Hart 2002) and therefore also affect 
stakeholder attitudes and political activities related to information systems development (Hart 
2002). Hirschheim and Newman (1991) observed, in their investigation of information 
systems development, that: 
 
 
“it can often be noted that there is a mystical value attached to the 
ownership of data. The sharing of data is thus to be avoided. There is a 
strongly held belief that harm will come from others accessing ‘our’ data, 
often without any basis in experience”. 
This paper focuses on data and information sharing behaviour. Because much research interest 
currently focuses on organizational knowledge, as opposed to data and information, 
management and sharing, we feel the wider issue of data and information sharing behaviour 
has been neglected (e.g. Nelson and Cooprider 1996; Hendricks 1999; Augier et al. 2001; 
Bartol and Srivastava 2002; Bock and Kim 2002; Jones 2002; Tsai 2002; Swart and Kinnie 
2003). 
For the purposes of explanation and simplicity, we present our analysis from the point of view 
of data sharing only and consider later what differences, if any, information as opposed to data 
sharing might entail. Moreover, since our aim is to understand and capture in a formal model 
at least certain aspects of the process leading to a decision of whether to share data, we need a 
general model of decision-making on which to base the subsequent argument. Again in the 
interests of simplicity, we adopt the traditional rational subjective expected utility (SEU) 
theory model of decision-making (e.g. Schoemaker 1982) acknowledging that this model of 
actual human decision-making may have significant deficiencies (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 
1986). It is, however, beyond the scope of our purpose in this paper to address the issue of 
how more sophisticated theories of human decision-making may affect the analysis. 
Preliminaries 
Consider a dataset D0, which may be partially or wholly non-computerized. In general there 
may be multiple datasets Di in an organization, each of which may be considered to consist of 
other distinct data subsets, but to simplify the analysis we consider only one such set, D0, from 
now on. 
A dataset such as D0 can be used as an input to a process that operates on it in some way to 
produce an output. This output is commonly called “information” (e.g. O’Brien, 1993: p.21). 
Diagrammatically: 
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A wide variety of different processes can operate on the dataset D0 in this way. As a result, the 
situation is in practice more like that shown in Figure 2, which shows the dataset as input to 
multiple processes P0, P1, P2, …, Pn leading to the various information outputs I0, I1, I2, …, In. 
 
Figure 2 
While the various processes operating on the dataset D0 may produce different information 
outputs, it is also possible that they produce outputs that are incompatible with or 
contradictory to each other. Moreover, the set of processes P0, P1, P2, …, Pn may, in the most 
general case, be extended to include everything that could conceivably be done with the 
dataset D0, including things that would be considered legitimate, as well as those that might 
be considered illegitimate. 
The different processes P0, P1, P2 … Pn may be associated with various organizational actors. 
Process Pi may actually be operated by organizational actor Aj. On the other hand the 
connection between a process and organizational actor may only be potential. For example, 
process Pi may not exist in reality, but if it did then the perception might be that a certain actor 
Aj would be the likely one to run it. In general. a single organizational actor may be linked to 
multiple processes. However, there is no reason why different actors may independently 
actually undertake the same processing on the same dataset to produce the same information 
output.  
The link between processes and actors is, in general, many-to-many. We illustrate this by 
further expanding Figure 2 to produce Figure 3, which is re-oriented for clarity and in which 
A0, A1, A2 … Am are organizational actors and the dashed connections indicate their 
associations with the various processes P. A dashed link between an actor Ai and a process Pj 
indicates that Ai either could run Pj on dataset to produce D0 to produce output Ij. 
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Figure 3 
The Value of Process Outputs and Information 
An organizational actor Ai can be expected to attach some value to actual and potential 
information outputs, regardless of whether the process is associated with themselves or 
another actor Aj. We may also expect that the value placed on a particular information output 
by one actor will, in general. differ from that placed on the same output by a different actor. 
This inherent value may be positive, negative or zero. 
The Value of Data Sharing 
The actual value (the subjective expected utility in SEU theory) an actor Ai attaches to some 
information output Ik resulting from process Pk that is associated with actor Aj will depend on 
their subjectively estimated probability of that output really being produced. As an example, 
even though a potential information output Ii might be extremely valuable to some actor, if the 
probability of its actually being produced is estimated by that actor to be zero then its actual 
value to them would be zero. Thus, the value of an output must be weighted by its probability 
of production in order to see its actual value.  
The perceived probability of production of a certain information output is, however, actor-
dependent. That is, one actor’s estimation of the probability of the production of a certain 
output may be different from that of another actor. We may, therefore, represent the 
probability estimated by actor Ai of an actor Aj operating some process Pk to produce an 
information output Ik as pijk. Note that the probabilities pijk are considered to be independent 
of one another. That is, the probability of one actor running a particular process to produce a 
certain output is assumed to be unrelated to the probability of occurrence of any other process. 
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Now consider actor A0 who controls dataset D0. What would be the value to A0 of sharing D0 
with all other actors? This is given by: 
V0 = Σj≠0Σk=0..np0jkv0jk 
That is, the value to A0 is the sum, in accordance with SEU theory, across all actors (other 
than themselves) and all processes of the actual value to them of the information outputs that 
those actors and processes will produce from D0. If this turns out to be positive (but not zero) 
then a rational value-maximizing actor A0 may be motivated to share the dataset D0 with all 
other actors. 
In a similar way, the value to some other actor Ai (not A0) of A0 sharing dataset D0 with all 
other actors is: 
Vi = Σj≠0Σk=0..npijkvijk 
If Vi (i ≠ 0) is positive then we may expect that the relevant actor (Ai) will be motivated to 
push for A0 to share D0 with all other actors. 
Restricted Sharing 
The calculations above relate to sharing across all actors. However, there are other possible 
cases to consider which involve more restricted sharing behaviour. Consider the value to actor 
Ai of A0 sharing dataset D0 with Ai alone. This is: 
Vii = Σk=0..npiikviik 
If Vii is positive but Vi is negative then actor Ai will be motivated to get A0 to share D0 with 
them, but also for them to block A0 sharing D0 with any other actor. More generally, the value 
to Ai (not A0) of A0 sharing dataset D0 with a third actor Aj, is: 
Vij = Σk=0..npijkvijk 
If this is positive, then we may expect that actor Ai will be motivated to get A0 to share D0 
with the third actor Aj. 
It remains to consider the intermediate case of sharing with some proper subset A ⊂ {A0, A1, 
…, Am} of all other actors. Suppose that α is the set of index values of the members of A. 
Then, the value to an actor Ai of A0 sharing dataset D0 with the members of A is: 
Viα = Σj∈αΣk=0..npijkvijk = Σj∈αVij 
 
 
and, if this is positive, Ai will be motivated to get A0 to share with the members of A. 
However, it is important to note that we may expect the value of ViA to vary if the 
membership of A is changed. This being so, if there is a subset A for which ViA is positive 
and maximal. then Ai will be motivated to share with this specific subset of actors in 
preference to any other subset (or all) actors. If there is no subset A for which ViA is non-
negative then the actor Ai will not be motivated to push for the actor A0 to share D0 with any 
other actor and, if it is significantly negative, they can be expected to actively oppose such 
sharing because they would deem it to be detrimental to their interests. 
Organizational Data and Information Sharing 
In the light of the analysis above, we now explore the circumstances under which it can be 
expected that all organizational actors concur in the sharing of dataset D0 with all other actors. 
On the assumption that the actors are rational value maximizing entities, this would entail 
that, for every actor Ai, Vi be not only non-negative, but also maximal. On the less restrictive 
assumption that the actors are merely satisficing entities (Simon 1957), it would still entail 
that, for every actor, Vi be non-negative although not necessarily maximal. Either way, it 
would seem that as organizations increase in number of actors, the likelihood of such 
conditions holding would progressively decrease and, coincidentally, also the likelihood of 
unproblematic organization-wide data sharing (an expectation that seems consistent with 
literature evidence). 
This model can also explain an organizational actor’s willingness to share processed outputs, 
or what we have here termed “information”, but at the same time for them to be reluctant to 
share the input data that was used to produce that information. As an example, in her classic 
study of the Financial Information System (FIS) implementation, Markus (1983) says: 
“Prior to FIS, divisional accountants summarized raw data on the 
transactions in their divisions and sent the summaries to the corporate 
accountants for consolidation. Divisions retained control of their own data 
and exercised substantial discretion in summarizing it…After FIS, however, 
all transactions were collected into a single database under the control of 
corporate accountants [so] FIS automatically performed the divisional 
summaries [and also] corporate accounts had the ability to “look into” the 
database and analyse divisional performance” 
 
 
The explanation is as follows. If the actor A0 provides a certain information output I0 directly 
to another actor A1, rather than the dataset D0 from which it was drawn, then A0 has 
successfully constrained the information received by A1 to I0 only. On the other hand, if A0 
were to release the dataset D0 to A1, then A1 could at least potentially generate not only I0 but 
also any number of other potential outputs Ii that will be of varying value to the original actor 
A0 in line with our analysis above. Moreover, the receiving actor A1 may signal that they will 
only generate output I0 for themselves but in fact generate a different output Î0 that is 
significantly different from the original I0 that A0 would have provided. In any case, it may 
well be that the actor A0, in assessing the value to them of A1 having I0, is greater than the 
value to them of A1 generating Î0 for themselves together with the risk that they will also 
generate some or all of the other possible outputs Ii in addition. 
In terms of the discussion above, actor A0 here represents the divisional accountants, the 
corporate accountants are represented by actor A1, the divisionally provided transactions 
summaries are I0, the corporately generated divisional transaction summaries are Î0, and the 
analyses of divisional performance based on the transactional data are all the other potential 
outputs Ii. Markus’ description of the FIS implementation and more particularly the effects it 
elicited regarding data and information sharing are readily understandable and explainable in 
terms of our value-based analysis. 
Limitations and Simplifying Assumptions 
A number of simplifying assumptions have been made in the foregoing analysis. Among these 
are: 
Non-informational results of sharing and other pressures 
Non-information based outputs and other pressures, have not been considered. For example, 
an organization may implement various incentives in order to encourage information sharing. 
These may affect the attitudes and value calculations of the various organizational actors, and 
consequently their decisions about whether and how to share. In order to incorporate these 
aspects our analysis could be extended along the lines of Ajzen and Fishbein’s “Theory of 
Reasoned Action” or TRA (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975, Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) in which a 
behaviour is deemed the combined result of a behavioural intention, attitudes and social 
norms as follows (after Upmeyer 1989): 
B = w1BI + (AB) w2 + (SN) w3 
 
 
where  
B = overt behaviour 
BI = behaviour intention 
w1 = empirical weight attached to BI 
AB = attitude toward behaviour B 
w2 = empirical weight attached to AB 
SN = subjective norms 
w3 = empirical weight attached to SN 
and 
AB = Σ BiEi 
where 
Bi = belief that behaviour will lead to outcome i 
Ei = evaluation of expected outcome i 
and a similar sum is made over the various sources of social norms to whom the actor is 
subject, and the actor’s motivation to act in accordance with those norms. Our analysis is 
limited to the attitudinal component in TRA, omitting the distinction between a behavioural 
intent, the behaviour itself and the effect of social norms or other pressures that may exist. 
Definition of the dataset to be shared 
It has been assumed that all actors share a common understanding of what comprises the 
dataset D0 and that they base their subjective value calculations on that understanding. 
However, even though the different actors may believe they have such a common 
understanding about what D0 is, they may not have it in fact. Thus, even if all the actors 
concur that sharing D0 is desirable as a result of their various value calculations, it may then 
emerge that the “D0”, on which their considerations were based, was different, possibly 
invalidating their conclusions regarding sharing it. See, for example, our discussion of the FIS 
described by Markus (1983) above in relation to the outputs I0 and Î0. 
Commonality of the process and output sets across actors 
We have assumed that that each actor has perfect and identical knowledge of what comprises 
the set of processes P = {P0, P1, … Pn} and their corresponding information outputs I = {I0, I1, 
… In}. We have also assumed that each actor perceives the same set of organizational actors  
and their connection to the processes P in their environment as every other actor. However, 
 
 
none of these assumptions are likely to be correct, at least in general. Different actors may be 
expected to know about and visualize different sets of processes P and their information 
outputs I. Therefore their subjective value calculations will vary not only because of 
differences of perception regarding the value of the various information outputs, but also 
because of differences of perception regarding what those outputs will in fact be in the first 
place. Moreover, because different actors may operate with different conceptions of who the 
actors other than themselves are, as well as the linkage of these actors to the information 
producing processes P, their value based motivations for data sharing (if any) may then be 
distributed across a different set of actor entities than is the case for others doing similar data 
sharing value assessments. While this would complicate the analysis in a particular case, it 
does not affect the analysis already presented. 
On-sharing 
It is possible that, once a dataset has been shared with an actor Ai (by, say, A0) then the 
receiving actor’s value calculations may differ so significantly from A0’s that it results in them 
passing on the dataset that originated from A0 to further actors that A0 would not have shared 
with on the basis of A0’s own value calculations. It may be, however, that if A0 knows about 
and assesses this risk, it will have its effect on their original subjective probability and value 
estimations regarding sharing with Ai. If this is indeed the case, then the model can be 
regarded as taking this possibility into account without need of modification. 
Context 
The number of actual and possible information producing processes P applicable to any 
particular dataset of significant size or complexity will most likely be large. Moreover, it is 
probable that even if different actors think they are talking about the same information 
producing process and output, they are not. The reason lies in the presence of contextual 
factors and interaction effects with other datasets, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Even if the input dataset (D0) is the same and the actors think that they are running the same 
process Pi on it, the output information is unlikely to be the same because of differences in 
other inputs and context, even if the actors themselves do not recognise them as being present, 
relevant or different. Shared data and information are subject to interpretation and cannot be 
assumed to hold the same meaning for those who have it (Miranda and Saunders 2003). It is 
therefore likely that the majority of processes shown in Figure 3 are actually unique to a single 
actor. In sharing a dataset with other actors, the originating actor should therefore expect that 
the receiving actor may well derive different information outcomes from the shared dataset 
than what they (the originating actor) might expect, even if they know in considerable detail 
what the receiving actor intends doing with it. 
Network, feedback and learning effects 
The analysis has assumed that data resident in some dataset is input to information producing 
processes P, and that the output is produced from that input in a single stage process. 
However, the output of one process Pi may itself form the input for a different process Pj, and 
so on. The reality, then, is rather a complex network of interlinked information producing 
processes, many of which operate upon or are affected by, in a contextual or interactive sense, 
the outputs of other information producing processes.  
Feedback effects may also exist to complicate matters even further. In subsequent time 
periods, actor A0 may have an improved ability to assess the value to themselves of sharing 
particular data sets. Similarly, other actors in the organisation may have a different 
understanding of A0’s motivation to share data. As these actors learn, the sharing dynamic may 
change commensurately.  
Factors Affecting Sharing 
In order for sharing to occur, the actor that is deciding whether or not to share a dataset D0 
needs to have a set of possible processes P0, P1, P2, …, Pn, their corresponding information 
outputs I0, I1, I2, …, In, and a set of estimated probabilities { pijk }in mind on which to base 
their deliberations. Factors affecting this are as follows. 
Awareness of Other Organizational Actors and the Effect of Ignorance 
While it may be possible to develop a list of all possible processes one could carry out on a 
given dataset, this would be infeasible in reality. Instead, the set of processes P0, P1, P2, …, Pn 
would more realistically be constructed from the sharing actor’s awareness of the other 
 
 
organizational actors and what they might conceivably do with the data if they were given the 
opportunity. In a similar way, the subjective estimation of the probability of each actor 
actually running a particular process on the dataset would depend on the knowledge and 
understanding the sharing actor had of the other party with whom they were considering 
sharing. 
It is interesting, in this context, to consider the effect of ignorance of the originating actor 
regarding the other party with whom they may be contemplating sharing. As Tversky and Fox 
(1995) note, “People typically do not know the exact probabilities associated with the relevant 
outcomes, but they have some vague notion about their likelihood”. Tversky and Fox find that 
the decision-making impact of a possible outcome moving from possibility to impossibility, 
or vice versa, is significantly greater than if it just becomes more or less probable. Now, with 
respect to data or information sharing, ignorance of the other actor amounts to the admission 
of anything they might conceivably do with the dataset into the realm of possibility. 
Furthermore, we may assume that of the complete set of processes and information outputs 
that could be run on the dataset concerned, the number that would be deemed illegitimate 
would greatly outnumber those considered legitimate. On this assumption, an actor’s value 
calculation regarding data and information sharing under conditions of ignorance is likely to 
be negative. Moreover, under conditions of uncertainty, it is known that lower probabilities 
are overestimated compared to intermediate to high ones (Fox and Tversky 1998): if 
something is deemed to be possible the probability of its actual occurrence tends to be 
overestimated. Alternatively, if the sharing actor knows enough about the other party to say 
with confidence that they will not run a certain process with the shared dataset then this will, 
as a result, contribute nothing to the sharing actor’s value calculation since the relevant pijk is 
zero. Further, since the probability pijk is now zero rather than some vague but non-zero 
amount and, under conditions of ignorance of the other actor, overestimated value, this may 
have a disproportionate impact on the decision to share compared to a simple change from 
one non-zero probability to another. 
Trust and Social Interaction 
Trust, or the willingness to allow oneself to be vulnerable to the actions of another over whose 
behaviour one has no control, has a positive effect on information sharing (e.g. Zand 1972, 
Butler 1999). Shapiro et al. (1992) identify three sources of trust: deterrence based, knowledge 
based, and identification based. Knowledge-based trust is founded in the confidence the 
trusting actor has that they know what the other party will do, and that the trusted party will 
 
 
act benevolently with respect to their interests. In terms of our analysis, this amounts to the 
sharing actor knowing (or thinking they know) what the receiving actor will do with the 
dataset they are contemplating sharing (i.e. knows the processes they probably will or will not 
run), and that their value calculation based on that knowledge for sharing is positive. 
Accordingly, the sharing actor will be inclined to trust and therefore share the dataset with the 
other party, as we have argued above. Alternatively, if the sharing actor does not know what 
the receiving actor will do but nevertheless identifies with them as being similar or empathic 
to themselves, then they can safely make assumptions about what the receiving actor may do 
with the shared dataset.  
Social interaction is known to have a “significant positive effect” on knowledge sharing (Tsai 
2002), network uptake (Stern et al. 2004) and, presumably, on data and information sharing 
also (Phillips et al. 2004). Moreover, explicit reward systems appear to be less effective at 
encouraging sharing behaviour (e.g. Bartol and Srivastava 2002, Bock and Kim 2002). 
However, organizational actors that engage in social interaction learn, through that 
interaction, more about each other as it proceeds. With respect to potential data, information 
and knowledge sharing, this learning enables each actor to assess more and more accurately 
how the other is likely to behave in the event of sharing taking place. This suggests that 
knowledge of the other party through social interaction can encourage sharing, but this rather 
occurs through an intervening value calculation step based on increased knowledge of, or 
identification based assumptions regarding, what the other party is likely to do with the shared 
dataset. 
Conclusions 
A primary implication of the analysis presented here is that in organizational situations where 
there are multiple datasets, many actual or potential information producing processes that do 
or could act on those datasets, and many organizational actors who may operate those 
processes, the unhindered sharing and integration of data across the organization is very likely 
to be difficult if not impossible to achieve. The process of trying to achieve such sharing or 
integration is likely to be fraught with difficulty and associated organizational conflict. This 
conclusion is unsurprising since this has been the experience of many organizations over 
many years, despite the undoubted existence of information technology capabilities capable of 
delivering the data and information sharing aimed at. 
 
 
Most business applications of information technology now entail data and information sharing 
not only internally but increasingly externally to the organization. It is, therefore, more 
important than ever to understand the motivations that encourage as well as hinder such 
sharing. The motivations for data and information sharing are well discussed and documented 
in the relevant literature. There are any number of articles touting the benefits waiting to be 
reaped from increased intra-organizational and inter-organizational sharing of data and 
information. Nevertheless, despite these undoubted benefits the sharing involved is often very 
difficult to achieve. 
This paper has provided a value-based analysis of data and information sharing that throws 
some light on why organizational actors may view information systems and other technologies 
that are targeted at achieving increased data and information sharing with misgivings and why 
the data and information sharing that they can undoubtedly provide in a technological sense is 
often not achieved in practice. 
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